This paper discusses how the Department of Defense can use automation in accomplishing its Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) mission. It describes the successful implementation of a commercial, off-the-shelf graphical information software system at an Armylevel headquarters. Lessons learned from that experience demonstrate the feasibility of exporting a ~nilar system to all headquarters responsible for MSCA. The final section of the paper suggests that the Federal Emergency Management Agency take the lead in promoting improvements in the automation environment for all organizations participating in disaster management.
INTRODUCTION: READINESS IS ALL

Not a whir, we defy augury; there's a special providence in the fall of a sparrow If it be now, 'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come: the readiness is all.
William Shakespeare 1564-16161
On the evening of October 27, 1993 Had the same request been made only ten months earlier, Ray would not have been able to respond in this fashion, since the Emergency Information System had not yet been installed. It was not until February 1993 that the system was activated for training and evaluation on Sixth US Army's local area network. But once it was operational, it matured quickly into a valuable system that served the entire Crisis Action Team at Sixth U.S. Army well. This is an account of how the system was installed, what we learned during the project, and what we could do to improve our ability to give military support to civil authorities in times of crisis.
A disaster can have enormous impacts on the region which it strikes, on its people, property, structures and economy. The human suffering disasters cause is well documented in detailed and extensive media coverage. The cost associated with disasters is astronomical. Improving the quality and timeliness of response to a disaster can contribute significantly toward mitigating its social, environmental, economic and political impact. The focus of this paper is that using automation can improve the process by which the DoD meets its mission of providing m~Htary support to civil authorities. More narrowly, it discusses automation and information management at the organization most directly involved in operational planning and directing of MSCA, the Continental Army Headquarters. Although communications and their integration into automated systems are critical to disaster response, they are not a primary focus here because that entire field is an area worthy of its own study.
This paper is organized into three parts. The first part is a brief review, from an Army perspective, of the organizations involved in authorizing and providing military support to civil authorities (MSCA). The second part is a description of the Sixth U.S. Army project and the lessons learned from it, and the third part consists of recommendations and suggestions for using automation to improve our ability to provide MSCA throughout the continental United
States and areas of the Pacific.
The information used for this paper came partly from published material, partly from meetings and telephone interviews, and partly from my notes and reports reflecting my experience gained as project officer.
PART I: INSTITUTIONS FOR THE COMMON PROTECTION
Government is, or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community
George Mason 1725-17925
There are many organizations that respond in time of crisis or disaster to lessen its impact on citizens. These organizations run across a wide spectrum from private volunteer organizations to local, county and State government to Federal government agencies. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to address their contribution to disaster relief. Instead, the focus is on the specific contribution made by the Department of Defense (DoD) in the form of providing Military Support to Civil Authorities {MSCA). And even here there are more contributors than space to discuss them in detail. What follows, therefore, is but a brief sketch of organizational responsibKities and authority to help understand the environment from the perspective of crisis response at an Army headquarters level On November 18th, 1988, President Reagan signed the Executive Order that assigned the current national security preparedness responsibilities to twenty-four Federal departments and agencies, among them the Department of Defense (DoD). 6 In its definition of what constitutes a national security emergency, it included "natural disaster." It assigned each of the Federal Departments and Agencies both lead responsibilities and support responsibilities.
The responsibility for coordinating the entire effort went to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
To implement this and other executive orders as well as several applicable public laws, most notably the Stafford Act, FEMA prepared, coordinated and published The Federal Re- GENERAl,. The purpose of this part is to show by the example of the Sixth U.S. Army project that it is possible to make significant improvements in the methods used to implement MSCA using relatively inexpensive, commercial off-the-shelf software (COTS) and an innovative approach to bring about positive changes. The project is a classic example of how to take excellent advantage of COTS. It succeeded because it was user-driven, and stayed within sparse resource constraints. After applying lessons learned and some of the recommendations later in this paper the success of the project could be duplicated at the other three CONUSA headquarters and at headquarters, CINCPAC. The description that follows consists of three parts.
The first discusses design considerations, the second focuses on implementation, and the third lists some of the lessons learned during the project.
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS.
The Crisis Action Tenm, To conduct MSCA and operations, the Sixth U.S. Army had organized a Crisis Action TeAm from the members of its staff. Called "Crisis Action Officers," these staff members had expertise generally consistent with the functional Lines of the ESFs.
Appro×~mately thirty-five permanent members of the headquarters were appointed to this team as an additional duty; this was enough to provide personnel for two shifts. There were some twenty or so others, mostly Liaison officers from other services or organization, who were also identified as team members, but who, because of their reserve status or geographic location, participated less frequently, usually only in major exercises and real world situations.
The team also had responsibility for mobilization operations.
Software Procurement. The commercial software used in the Sixth U.S. Army project is called the Emergency Information System (EIS). The system is designed to assist with command, control and communications during crisis situations and to help manage response to natural and technological disasters. Combining "PC-based interactive programs and cr/tical databases with colorful computer-generated maps to support crisis decision making, ''12 its strength is its ability to display situational information, to help determine appropriate responses, and to communicate. In the resource-constrained Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters, its relatively affordable price made it an "enabling technology" that was economically feasible for were still under development. This introduced some ambiguity into the project goals, and we recognized that we might need to redesign parts of the system in order to integrate any new requirements into an overall system concept.
Method of Analysis. The method of analysis chosen for the project is important because it provides the structure --the road map --to success. The information engineering method 14 is one that is commonly accepted, but because we worked under severe time andpersonnel constraints, we did not use this elaborate and deliberate method to take the project through its various stages. Instead, we confined our planning to working out a gross design report. 15 That approach calls for definition of the problem, setting objectives, identifying constraints, determining information needs, and determining information sources, followed by developing alternative gross designs, selecting the best design, and then preparing a gross design report.
Problem Statement. Because of the manner of the initial procurement, no detailed and rigorous problem analysis was done prior to procurement. However, observations of existing crisis action management techniques at Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army revealed the following opportunities for improvement:
• The CAT was l~m~ted by use of strictly manual procedures.
• There was a requirement for operation (and automation support) at an alternate, remote site, but there were no procedures developed to accomplish this.
• Reference material needed for crisis operations was widely dispersed throughout the headquarters. Crisis Action Officers (CAOs) brought reports, SOPs, regulations, notes, and phone books with them when the CAT assembled.
• Senior decision makers required at least one situation briefing daffy. Two more briefings were required each day upon shift change. Yet there was no briefing tool available to the team that was also integrated with the crisis action process.
System Objectives. Based on informal interviews and the opportunities for improvement noted above, we set out the objectives for the project accordingly. They were: to update and automate manual procedures; to establish remote automated operations; to consolidate records and references in one system; and to establish integrated briefing procedures.
Constraints.
If there had been no constraints, the project might have looked different, done more, and undoubtedly cost more --much more. But we did work under constraints which limited our exploration of EIS' potential. The constraints we identified were limited persormel, funds, system design skills, and the need to use existing equipment.
Information Needs. Because of the time constraint, we performed only an abbreviated, preliminary survey of information processed in the Emergency Operations Center. The survey revealed that the CAT needed the following types of information:
• Resources (Personnel, Equipment, Sites)
• Geographic Data (maps and overlays)
• Plans, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Checldists
• Log of events and actions taken Information Sources. As sources of information, we found that the foUowing entities were the major contributors to the system: Step-by-step instructions and plans are available to CAOs for reference. Validated requests from FEMA are received and entered into the event log. A CAO is assigned to research available resources using the on-line data.
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When the CAO determines which unit or organization can best meet the request, he or she obtains approval of the CAT Team Chief and issues a tasking. The CAO makes an entry in the event log showing action taken and continues to monitor the action until it is completed.
Entries from the event log form the basis for briefings to decision makers, and to other CAOs upon shift change. Event log entries are also used for periodic SITREPs to higher headquarters, except that SITREPs must be assembled off-line because of format requirements. Event log entries can be printed upon termination of the crisis to provide a basis for cost recovery.
Software System Functions. Another way of viewing the process just described is to break it down into its component functions. The system functions shown here are those that we applied to the EOC crisis response process. (EIS has many additional capabilities that may warrant exploration in the future. For example, contamination management, aerial locations of hazardous atmospheres (i.e. plume display); or accepting images from aerial overflights or from sateUites.) A summary listing of those functions shows that the system:
• Serves as central repository for reference material and plans. Tracks progress of plans.
• Provides a log of events and actions, and tracks their status.
• Locates resources and tracks their use.
• Displays geographic relationships.
• Serves as an integral briefing tool
• Provides a means of data and message communications.
So,ware Design. After the problem is analyzed, after processes and data are identified, the next step would normally be to develop the software needed to accomplish the various functions. However, the commercial software we used had its screen formats already designed, its data base had been defined, and it had a data dictionary as part of its documentation. Its processes, map interfaces, map overlays, and data definitions had been designed specifically for disaster management. Therefore, the soKware design phase normally called for at this stage was not necessary, an advantage that COTS provides. Rather, our design effort concerned itself more with making EIS useful to the CAT in a variety of physical configura-
tions. We developed and tested three of them. The alternate site configuration can also be used in those cases where a substantial number of CAOs --perhaps ten or so --are located away from the home station near the site of a disaster. The server has the capabiLity to support perhaps up to twenty users simultaneously, and to provide them with essentially the same capabilities as the home station LAN.
Equipment Configuration at
This was an important consideration because much effort had been invested in training staff members in the use of the home station LAN, and asking them to learn a different system would have been counter productive. Information Content of the System. We did not have the time and people needed to assemble an extensive data base. But we did develop and publish a data dictionary that supplemented the one furnished by the vendor. Using both normal methods to type data as well as the data import module furnished by EIS, we were able to populate the data base with generated and imported data:
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•
Resource Data: over 14,000 DoD resource records from FEMA regions VIII, IX and X.
• Nineteen Point-of-Contact data files
• Plans, SOPs and Emergency Action Measures (EAMs).
• Geographic data consisting of maps and map overlays.
• Event and action log templates to be opened for each exercise or crisis response.
LESSONS LEARNED.
Hardware 
PART III: WHAT MORE CAN WE DO?
All this will not be fini. ~ed in the first one hundred days. Nor udlI it be finished in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this Administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet.
But let us begin.
John Fitzgerald Kennedy 1917-196324 While the preceding section shows that significant improvements can be achieved even with relatively few resources and COTS, there is still much more that should be done to improve, through automation, our ability to accomplish our MSCA mission. As successful as the Sixth U.S. Army project was, it still needs improvement, especially in the system data. First, resource data need to be collected and made more useful, and existing data need to be mainrained. These tasks require trained, permanent employees, but manpower spaces are especially scarce during the current draw down. The Sixth U.S. Army has taken the project about as far as it can within its own limited dollar and personnel resources. It needs help with those resources from its higher headquarters. Secondly, to achieve synergism through systems compatibility, only guidance and direction to the entire disaster response community from FEMA can help.
Act Now. The experience of the Sixth U.S. Army project clearly demonstrates that commercial, off-the-shelf software can do the job. It helps the crisis action team to prepare ahead of time by providing a focal, single repository system for plans, procedures, resources, contacts, and geographic information. Moreover, as part of an integrated system consisting of people, equipment and procedures the software system makes a significant synergistic contribution to the MSCA effort. In emergency response, it is vital that the right information gets put out to the right people and places quickly. EIS is a tool to get that done, and we should equip our crisis action teams with it so they can better respond to people in need.
In It is conceivable that the EIS will not meet each and every requirement identified in the DRPS study exactly. However, purchasing a system that closely meets our needs, that is cheaper and probably better documented than one that is developed in-house, and that is available immediately and will produce immediate performance benefits, is preferable to waiting for a perfect fit that may never materialize. 29 EIS' performance, as demonstrated at Sixth U.S. Army meets the process needs very closely. It is an excellent match, in fact, considering the relatively reasonable costs. Therefore, for the short term, perhaps five years or so, EIS could significantly improve automation support of the MSCA function. As a maturing software enterprise, 30 the vendor already has mechanisms in place for responding to customer requests for change; 31 it is very possible that the system will grow to meet DoD's specifications and needs in the future as weU. And even if it does not, and is replaced in five years, it will have provided a worthwhile and valuable service during those five years.
To be of immediate benefit to those headquarters in DoD charged with the responsibility for actually carrying out the MSCA mission, EIS only needs to be installed at the three other CONUSAs and at HQ, CINCPAC. The intermediate headquarters at FORSCOM and ACOM, and at DOMS wouid benefit from an installation (with fewer copies) as well. This would allow for electronic transmittal of situation reports and briefings with concise geographic information.
Promote Interoperability. Lack of interoperability among systems is a problem in the entire crisis management community. It was a problem in coordinating emergency response capabilities of civil agencies in support of DoD during Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations.
One of the recommendations made in a report that evaluated civil agency support for those operations was that "FEMA assume the lead in ... ensure[ing] timely information exchange and coordination between the civil agencies and DoD in a crisis. "32 Achieving information exchange and close coordination is made even more difficult when the automation assets used in the various agencies are not compatible with one another. In another example, the after action report for the RESPONSE 93 exercise mentions the proliferation of equipment that the participating organizations brought to the exercise. Predictably, very little of it was compatible. The report pointed out that ~DOD, USACE, and FEMA all use different computer systems to support response operations .... there is no overall plan for system and software to be used, leading to serious availability and interoperability problems when responders from many different departments and agencies arrive on scene. "33 The report goes on to recommend that "FEMA should develop and designate a "standard suite" of computer resources for a Federal response operation and provide guidance on the use of computer systems and programs in support of field operations." Which is precisely the point of this paper.
When selecting a system it is important to consider its ability to share information with others. At Sixth U.S. Army, we have on many occasions received assistance from other EIS users. The Concord Navat Weapons Station gave us all the electronic maps we needed for California. During the Gila River floods, the Arizona State Office of Emergency Management gave us copies of their maps for Arizona. Ray Tingstrom provided status information to FEMA.
None of this would have been possible as readily without aU of us having the same software system. Considering the installed user base for EIS, consisting of over 3000 copies sold to over 1000 customers worldwide, including the emergency management offices at 22 States and more than 50 Air Force Bases plus 18 Air Guard units, 34 it has established itself as the de facto standard graphical information system (GIS) for disaster response, if not formally, then at least by weight of sheer numbers and market penetration.
Another consideration related to interoperability is ease of use. A user-friendly system like EIS is more likely to be accepted widely than one that is more difficult to master. Tom Modem data base programs show great flexibility in freely accepting and exchanging data between one another. Rigid data standards are therefore not as necessary as they used to be. However, the worst time to attempt data conversion is under the stress induced by a catastrophe. A basic set of data standards in the form of a data dictionary, coordinated as necessary, and published by FEMA would be helpful to organizations at all levels in the disaster response community towards improving compatibility and expedient data transfer during exercises and real situations.
There is a wealth of information that is already captured in electronic form. Many data bases that contain resource information already exist in the DoD and throughout the Federal, State and local governments. Consolidating the salient items from each of these data bases for crisis response is a formidable task, but its feasibility should be exploited, nonetheless.
The vendor, EIS, International is doing precisely that by incorporating public domain data Federal, State, and local authorities following these disasters, the TSP System played a critical role in disaster and recovery efforts. "45 Nonetheless, some damage is usually not avoidable;
for this reason, RESPONSE 93 incorporated lack of telephone communications for four hours into the first day of the exercise in order to make the exercise play more realistic. 46 Perhaps a strengthened, enhanced NIl could cut such down times sigrdficanfly.
What an enhanced information superhighway could mean to someone like Ray Tingstrom is that not only could he transmit and receive immediately needed emergency information, but he could also share and exchange data and graphic information with other organizat.ions on a routine basis during quiet times in order to facilitate preparedness. He can do this now, but he is limited by the relatively slow and inefficient modem transmission process. At information superhighway speeds, he and all the others involved in disaster response and 2V preparedness would have a better chance of overcoming the deficiencies with integration and coordination that have hampered past efforts.
Train and Exercise. Whatever changes and improvements are made, the people expected to implement them must be trained in their use. Training has a functional aspect (how to use a system) as well as a technical aspect (how to maintain the system on its platform). Both types of training must be accomplished and planned for. Functional training should not be limited only to learning the software system, however. CAOs need to learn and practice crisis response procedures as well. This lesson was also learned during RESPONSE 93 which found a lack of understanding --due to a lack of training --in the basics of the Federal Response Plan (FRP). 47
An exceUent method of training while at the same time shMdng problems out of the total system is conducting exercises. Sixth U.S. Army conducted one such exercise with its Crisis Action Team each month. Conducting more and realistic exercises was one prescript/on for improvement that Hutzler recommended in her study on civil agency support of the DoD. In order to ensure that civil agencies, especially those that are not normally involved in the crisis response process maintain the skill and knowledge required for adequate response, she urged that "FEMA assume the lead in ... explor[ing] options for improving and/or expanding civil agency and DoD exercising of crisis response coordination mechanisms. "48
SUMMARY: KNOWLEDGE IS POWER
In a time of turbulence and change, it is more true than ever that knowledge is power John Fitzgerald Kennedy 1917-196349
The disaster response community needs central direction of the type that FEMA can best provide. The Army can act only for DoD, but if the Army goes its own way, and the other agencies do likewise, a significant opportunity to improve and streamline disaster response on behalf of our citizens will be lost.
The automation tools we need are available from commercial sources today, and they are certainly adequate for the near term and perhaps in the long term, also. EIS International has already done the systems analysis and design related to disaster response processes.
The Sixth U.S. Army project has demonstrated its usefulness and applicability. The DoD and other Government agencies should capitalize on that analysis and design investment rather than delaying fielding a much needed tool by conducting yet another study.
The disaster response community has come a long way already in improving its service to citizens in need. To maintain this momentum, to preserve what we have learned so far, and to enhance future capabilities, long term planning for ESF #5 from a central office at FEMA is essential. There are some encouraging signs of progress. Having learned to appreciate the value of interactive data communications, FEMA established its own data Link using the EIS software in attempting to provide real-time disaster response during the Northridge Earthquake in California. 50
The mission of providing support to civil authorities in times of crisis is an important one. A timely response can prevent loss of property and save lives. Morally and politically, as we have seen during Hurricane Andrew, an inadequate or delayed response is not acceptable.
It is vital that agencies responsible for crisis response like the Sixth U.S. Army are prepared to respond immediately whenever the next disaster strikes. Automated systems like the Emergency Information System, that can respond with the speed of a computer to disseminate vital information, are indeed a valuable tool in such a critical mission.
